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Abstract
Two key questions in Malaysia's corporate history have not yet been answered. 
Why is it that only a small number of family ﬁrms produce brand products? 
Why has none emerged as a major publicly listed enterprise? This study employs 
concepts from family business literature as well as Alfred Chandler, Jr's business 
history approach to answer these questions. A blend of conceptual tools from 
these two bodies of literature offers insights into the evolution of these brand 
product family ﬁrms. By adopting this approach, this study reveals that the core 
issues requiring scrutiny are an enterprise's volume of investments in research 
and development, a skilled managerial team and an effective marketing tech-
nique. Other issues include the need for a sound succession plan and a focus on a 
horizontal form of enterprise development. This article also reviews the capacity 
of the state to enable as well as hamper the rise of domestic brand product ﬁrms.
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The Puzzle: Family Firms and Brand Products
A major concern about family ﬁrms with a long and leading presence 
in the Malaysian economy is that they have no reputation for produc-
ing brand products, i.e., a consumer good or service embodied in a 
trademark, design or symbol that has emerged as a household name 
(Acker 2002; Anholt 2005). This is the case even though families con-
trol about 40 per cent of publicly listed companies, while the top ten 
families own a quarter of total market capitalization of the country's 
stock exchange, Bursa Malaysia. Three of the top ten quoted ﬁrms are 
family controlled. 
Only a handful of small and medium-sized family ﬁrms have pro-
duced brand products of local and international repute. Four such 
brand products are Boh tea, Eu Yan Sang Chinese medicine, Yeo Hiap 
Seng bottled drinks and Royal Selangor handcrafted pewter ware. It is 
interesting as well, that not all these families have publicly listed their 
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ﬁrms and none has emerged as a major corporate enterprise in Malaysia, 
in terms of market capitalization. Crucially, not all of these four brand 
products remain under the control of the founding family.
Given this situation, the study will deal with two key questions. 
First, what distinguishes this handful of family ﬁrms that have shown 
the capacity to produce brand products? Second, why is it that these 
family ﬁrms that produce brand products have not emerged as major 
publicly listed enterprises?
Linking Family Enterprise and Business History
Studies of family ﬁrms seldom if ever attempt to incorporate the tools 
of analysis provided by Alfred Chandler, Jr. (Chandler 1962, 1977, 1990; 
Chandler et al. 1997).1 This study will use conceptual tools provided by 
the bodies of literature that focus speciﬁcally on family ﬁrms and busi-
ness history. These two bodies of literature have not been used together 
when analyzing the factors that aid the development of brand products 
within an economy.
In the literature on family ﬁrms, key topics of concern include suc-
cession planning, public listing, professionalization of management 
and research and development (R&D).2 These core factors determine 
the sustainability or demise of family ﬁrms, as well as their capacity 
to produce brand products. Chandler's business history, on the other 
hand, entails an exhaustive assessment of the ﬁrm from within, in par-
ticular its organizational and managerial structure from the moment of 
its incorporation. His primary concerns are two-fold: when and how 
change occurred within a ﬁrm, and the 'organizational capabilities' of 
the enterprise, speciﬁcally its capacity for cumulative learning (Chandler 
1990). The ﬁrm's ability to establish strong vertical roots in its production 
process was also of crucial concern to Chandler, though he concedes 
that there are periods when diversiﬁcation might be necessary. Diver-
siﬁcation can determine the progress or demise of a ﬁrm at important 
junctures in its history. The rise or fall of a ﬁrm depends primarily on 
whether it invests enough in three key areas: manufacturing, marketing 
and management (Chandler 1990).
Chandler employs the concept 'administrative coordination' to 
draw attention to the need for managerial hierarchies embedded in an 
enterprise with professional control structures separate from owner-
ship. The growing professionalization of a company's management is 
important in the long run, to avoid institutional failure (Chandler 1977). 
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Administrative coordination is inadequately emphasized in the family 
ﬁrm literature, even though the literature stresses the need for such 
companies to incorporate professional managers. 
According to pioneering works in the literature on ownership and 
control, such as Berle and Means (1967) and Penrose (1959), transitions 
in a business from family ownership to managerial control can bear 
greatly on its development. In the family business literature, transitions 
in ownership and control are discussed in the context of 'generational 
change', brought about when a family ﬁrm is taken over by descendants 
(Gomez 2007; Wong 1985). Chandler and Penrose discuss the (three) 
stages of enterprise evolution: a business starts as a partnership before 
evolving into a sole proprietorship or a family ﬁrm. This is because 
partnerships are seldom sustainable in the long term. In the third or 
ﬁnal stage, the ﬁrm will evolve in such a way that it can be described as 
an enterprise under managerial control (Chandler 1962, 1977; Penrose 
1959). While the transition period from a partnership to single owner-
ship or a family-owned enterprise can be quite rapid, the evolution to 
managerial control normally takes a generation or two (Chandler 1962, 
1977; Penrose 1959). 
Chandler argues that the growth of modern industry is primarily due 
to its capacity to upgrade its technology for mass production, referred 
to as R&D. To upgrade technology and boost distribution, managers 
have to look internally, at the ﬁrm's organizational structure, to rectify 
or introduce new mechanisms to augment innovation and increase the 
market share of the ﬁrm's products (Chandler 1977). 
However, Chandler underestimates the family's contribution to 
growth and efﬁciency. Dyer (1986, 2003), Jones and Rose (1993), Daily 
and Dollinger (1992) and Colli (2003) emphasize the intertwining rela-
tion between family and business in the development of family ﬁrms. 
Family knowledge and interests shape every dimension of the enterprise: 
strategy, governance, organizational structure and succession. Fam-
ily control and ownership patterns determine whether the enterprise 
survives or fails. If the controlling shareholder(s) is prepared to adapt 
to management and technological change, the family factor need not 
hinder the growth of the business. 
Chandler inadequately tackles other important factors common 
among family ﬁrms in Asia. The issue of networks is of core concern in 
the literature on corporate development in Asia, speciﬁcally in studies of 
Chinese enterprise (see, for example, Hamilton 1996; Wong 1985) and of 
the political economy of development involving the nexus between the 
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state and capital (see, for example, Gomez 2009; Hewison, Robison and 
Rodan 1993; Wade 1990). The ostensible capacity of business networks 
to create tightly knit, interlocking ownership and directorship ties has 
been debunked (Gomez 1999; Gomez and Hsiao 2004). However, coop-
erative ties to coordinate production, distribution and consumption of 
products and services are well noted, creating what has been referred 
to as a form of 'network organization', apparently a unique institutional 
feature of Asian capitalism and a system that is distinctive from the 
Western notion of bureaucratization and efﬁciency (Whitley 1992). These 
production networks, however, do not form in a single dimension but 
primarily comprise chains of producers or sub-contractors that oper-
ate at multiple levels and whose membership changes over time. The 
research in this study further corroborates the point that production 
networks are not sustained over a protracted period, but are subject to 
change when new technologies are introduced to improve the quality 
of products produced.
The political economy literature, while providing an extensive ap-
praisal of the role of the government in encouraging enterprise develop-
ment, notes the rather diverse patterns of corporate growth adopted by 
ﬁrms selected for patronage. In Japan, the keiretsu system was instituted, 
while the emphasis of the Taiwanese state was on nurturing small and 
medium-scale enterprises (Wade 1990). In South Korea, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia, well-connected ﬁrms adopted a conglomerate 
pattern of growth (Amsden 1989; Gomez 2009; Rodan et al. 1997). In 
all these Asian countries, the companies privy to state patronage were 
primarily family owned (Gomez 1999; Jesudason 1989; Searle 1999).
It is also important that the historical relationship between the state 
and family ﬁrms in Asia has been fraught with friction because different 
groups hold political and economic power and decisions determining 
how state-generated resources are distributed are not always made 
with the aim of promoting an economic sector or developing domestic 
enterprise. The pattern of power distribution and the consequence of 
power shifts due to political struggles have had serious repercussions 
on the ownership and control of family ﬁrms (Rodan et al. 1997). What 
is also needed is an analysis of the political and economic context in 
which the ﬁrm exists, to assess the conditions within which it has to 
operate and adapt in order to rise within the corporate sector.
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Methodology: Case Studies
In this article, four family enterprises are examined in historical and 
comparative perspective: Eu Yan Sang International, Royal Selangor 
International, Boh Plantations and Yeo Hiap Seng. These family ﬁrms 
share common features that facilitate comparison, not just with each 
other, but also with other major enterprises in Malaysia not associated 
with a particular brand product or service. All four are in manufactur-
ing, producing goods that have achieved national or international ac-
claim. All have a long history, having started up in the colonial period 
and come under the control of a second or third generation, although 
in one case the founding family has lost control. All have experienced 
a number of crises, leading in some cases to near collapse. 
Eu Yan Sang International—Traditional Chinese Medicine
In 1879, a general provisions shop, Yan Sang, opened in Gopeng, in the 
state of Perak. Eu Kong, the founder, sold Chinese goods, including 
medicinal products, and remitted money to families of migrants from 
rural China. He subsequently diversiﬁed into tin mining and revenue 
farming (taxes on opium, alcohol, gambling and pawnbroking) (Chung 
2002: 588-593; Sharp 2009: 14; Yeung 2006: 13). His key concern was to 
accumulate capital, not to gain a reputation in a particular industry. 
The founder's only son, Eu Tong Sen, recognized Chinese medicine 
had become a popular product. Around 1910, he attached the family 
name to his company's medicinal products (Chung 2002: 582; Sharp 
2009: 52). The name Eu Yan Sang (EYS) reﬂected the bond between the 
Eu family and the enterprise Yan Sang. 'Yan Sang' in Cantonese means 
caring for mankind. The company established branches in towns around 
the Malay Peninsula and two branches in Hong Kong and Canton. A 
team of managers comprising family and non-family was recruited to 
monitor and coordinate administration. Strict production measures 
were introduced to ensure high-quality herbal medicine, a clear invest-
ment by Tong Sen in management and R&D. EYS branches functioned 
not merely as distribution outlets but also as procurement centres and 
processing factories. Raw herbs were selected in Hong Kong and shipped 
and distributed to the branches in Singapore and Malaya, where they 
were processed, categorized and sold. EYS' marketing entailed the 
processing and sale of herbs by hand, a personalized service that helped 
increase its clientele. 
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By the time the third generation took over the enterprise in the 1940s, 
in keeping with theorization by Penrose (1959) and Berle and Means 
(1967), professional managers had been entrusted with running the 
business, which further contributed to its development. Lo Kwee Seong, 
a Hong Kong-based manager with a university degree in economics, 
invented new packaging for EYS, so the ﬁrm became the ﬁrst to sell 
Chinese medicine in pill and capsule form (Sharp 2009: 101). Yeung Chi 
Poh, a general manager, established the Weng Li Company to central-
ize purchasing Chinese herbs and traditional medicines from China 
and Hong Kong, which greatly improved quality control (Yeung 2006: 
145-146). Production was centralized in Hong Kong and Malaysia. By 
centralizing purchasing and manufacturing, EYS achieved greater proﬁt-
ability. An aggressive series of creative marketing and brand-building 
campaigns through the media, especially television, was used to promote 
EYS as a major manufacturer of Chinese traditional medicine. In 1973, 
EYS was publicly listed in Singapore, but ownership was reduced by a 
mere 25 per cent. Four outsiders were appointed to the board of direc-
tors, while only three Eu brothers remained as directors (Sharp 2009: 
130; Yeung 2006: 142). 
Family solidarity began to break down when the fourth generation 
took charge in 1989. Richard Eu Yee Ming, son of Eu Keng Mun and 
grandson of Tong Sen, was appointed general manager at EYS Holdings 
(Sharp 2009: 131; Yeung 2006: 148). Yee Ming formulated an ambitious 
ﬁve-year expansion plan. However, not all the third-generation seniors 
agreed, and some began selling their shares to Lum Chang Holdings, 
the largest construction ﬁrm in Singapore. Tong Sen's other sons living 
abroad divested their equity, as they felt geographically and psychologi-
cally distanced from Eu family affairs. They saw little need to retain an 
interest in the ﬁrm, which had paid relatively poor dividends (Sharp 
2009: 132). In 1990, Lum Chang took over EYS Holdings. This takeover 
almost led to its demise, for Lum Chang's primary aim was to develop 
its property business through a listed vehicle, as well as to capitalize 
on its properties. 
In 1993, Yee Ming and three cousins spearheaded a successful buyout 
of EYS from Lum Chang. Family strife again erupted in 1996, when 
Charles Eu, a member of the third generation in charge of the Hong 
Kong operation, demanded the right to use the EYS international 
trademark and ﬁled a lawsuit against EYS International in Singapore. 
He also wanted to install two associates, members of China's People's 
Liberation Army (PLA), on the board of directors (Sharp 2009: 135-136). 
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Shareholders met to sack him, and EYS Hong Kong was taken over by 
EYS International of Singapore and delisted from the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. It was consolidated as a single company and Yee Ming and 
his cousins became the major shareholders. 
Under their leadership, more non-family members were appointed to 
the board of directors, an executive management team was introduced 
to oversee the group's operations, and big investments were made to 
enhance product development and marketing. By 2010, the board of di-
rectors had an equal number of family and non-family members. In 2000, 
EYS invested HK$24.5 million in R&D, chieﬂy by linking up with univer-
sities. The company worked with the Chinese University of Hong Kong 
to produce the Bang Fong Pill, a traditional medicine to enhance women's 
health. In 2001, a joint venture with West China (Huaxi) University of 
Medical Sciences developed herbal medicines to treat lifestyle diseases.3 
Through such R&D-based joint ventures, the ﬁrm introduced more than 
300 products under the EYS brand and more than 1,000 Chinese herbs and 
medicinal products. To market this huge range, around 150 additional 
retail outlets were established in China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, 
Malaysia and Singapore. EYS also retails its products through wholesale 
chains such as Watson's, Wellcome and PARKnSHOP in Hong Kong; 
Jaya Jusco, Wellsave, Makro and Parkson's in Malaysia; and Guardian 
and Cold Storage in Singapore.4 EYS has emerged as the largest Chinese 
medicine retail chain in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.
Royal Selangor—Pewter Products
In 1885, Yong Koon arrived in Kuala Lumpur from China to join his 
two brothers, working as tinsmiths. They established an enterprise 
that produced simple household and ceremonial items such as pewter 
incense burners, joss-stick holders and candle stands for Chinese altars. 
Yong Koon acquired a shop-house and incorporated Malayan Pewter 
Works, but the Great Depression hit the ﬁrm. The recession contributed 
to a major change in product output. G.H. Hutton, an English engineer, 
advised Yong to take advantage of the low price of tin to produce 
European-style products such as cigarette boxes, ashtrays, vases and 
teapots (Chen 2003: 22-27). This horizontal diversiﬁcation allowed Yong 
to capture a new market. 
As the patriarch of the family aged, the four sons took charge of the 
enterprise in the mid-1930s, but were soon at loggerheads. This led to a 
split, with each brother incorporating a pewter company: Tiger Pewter, 
Selangor Pewter and Lion Pewter (Chen 2003: 33; Toyad and Gopinath 
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2010: 10). Only Selangor Pewter, run by the third brother, Yong Peng 
Kai, survived. 
Selangor Pewter thrived when Peng Kai improved manufacturing by 
introducing machinery and hired workers to create a production line. 
In 1962, the company changed from home-based production to a fac-
tory-based enterprise. This transition was in response to a government 
policy to support local industry. The government provided the ﬁrm 
with a loan of 150,000 Malaysian ringgit, as well as three consultants 
from the International Labour Organization, to enable the factory to 
function efﬁciently (Chen 2003: 63). The enterprise created a work plan 
and enhanced its mechanization.
Peng Kai invested in tertiary education for his children and rela-
tives, so they would have professional expertise to beneﬁt the busi-
ness. Yong Poh Kon, his youngest son, who studied mechanical 
engineering at the University of Adelaide in the 1960s, introduced 
new production processes, including hydraulic presses and alloying 
metals. A joint venture with Soltauer Zinngiesserei allowed the ﬁrm 
access to German technology for casting pewter using steel moulds 
(Chen 2003: 75). Guay Boon Lay, Peng Kai's niece, who had a talent 
for art, was sent to Bristol Art College in the UK in 1970; she returned 
to head the company's design department (Chen 2003: 70). Peng Kai 
hired a professional designer, Anders Quistgaard, from Denmark, 
who established a House Design Committee to evaluate new designs. 
The contribution made by Poh Kon and Boon Lay to new production 
techniques and skill formation on the shop ﬂoor greatly increased the 
quality and range of products. 
Aggressive marketing was also used. Brochures and catalogues were 
sent to agents throughout the country as well as to Europe and North 
America. Media outlets, especially local and overseas newspapers, 
were used to advertise products. Pewter showrooms were launched in 
Malaysia's major towns (Beamish 2000: 232). The ﬁrm established of-
ﬁces in foreign markets and promotional teams demonstrated how the 
products were made. An extensive network of 70 shops and hundreds 
of in-store counters worldwide displayed and marketed the products. 
As its international prestige grew, the government in 1979 bestowed 
the name 'Royal Selangor'.
When the third generation took the helm in 1980, the ﬁrm's manage-
ment was further professionalized. The board of directors, once exclu-
sively the domain of the Yongs, now includes outsiders: Tham Tuck 
Yong, a British-trained engineer, is the executive director in charge of 
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day-to-day operations; C.Y. Wong, who joined the ﬁrm in 1984, is the 
president of Royal Selangor USA and oversees the North American 
market; and Peter Coleman is the managing director of Royal Selangor 
UK (Chen 2003: 112). They were appointed as company directors in 2002. 
Fourth-generation family were appointed to management, including 
Yong Yoon Hong, the corporate graphics manager who once worked 
for the UK design consultancy Addison Nelson, and Sun Chee Yan, the 
information-technology manager who once worked with DHL World-
wide Express and Hewlett-Packard (Chen 2003: 113).
By 2002, 55 per cent of Royal Selangor's turnover was from sales 
abroad, in 25 countries, compared with just 2 per cent in 1972 (Anholt 
2005: 67). The ﬁrm has emerged as the largest global producer and dis-
tributor of pewter ware gifts. 
Boh Plantations—Tea 
The founder of this enterprise, John Archibald Russell, was ﬁrst em-
ployed by the Straits Trading Company in Malaya in the early 1900s. 
In 1904, he established J.A. Russell & Company, initially in tin mining, 
though he diversiﬁed into coal mining, rubber planting, manufactur-
ing and property development (Wong 2010: 29-30). After the crash of 
commodity prices in 1927, Russell decided to plant tea, whose price had 
remained stable. In 1929, the well-connected Russell, together with A.B. 
Milne, a veteran tea planter from Sri Lanka, obtained a grant of 4,000 
acres of land in Cameron Highlands from the federal government. Boh 
Plantations was incorporated to cultivate tea on this land. 
The ﬁrst harvest was sold to a Chinese contractor, who converted it 
into a semi-fermented tea that found a ready market among the Chi-
nese on the Malayan plains. When a factory was built in 1934, tea was 
prepared for export; the ﬁrst consignment was sold in London. Russell 
did not survive to see this: he died suddenly in 1933. His untimely 
death, coupled with the Great Depression, seriously affected his busi-
ness empire. Kathleen, his wife, sold all his ventures, keeping only the 
plantations. The funds from the sale were used to continue ﬁnancing 
the plantations, which came under the management of professionals.5 
In 1949, Russell's only son, Tristan, who had completed undergraduate 
studies in agriculture in England, took charge. 
Before World War II, Boh Plantations had exported mainly to the UK, 
then the world's chief consumer of tea. When the UK imposed restrictions 
on tea imports, Boh Plantations' proﬁts fell. In the post-war period, the 
company focused on creating a domestic market in response to growing 
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demand. Tea imports from Sri Lanka, India and China had been increas-
ing in the post-war period. In 1947, 5 million pounds were imported, 
compared with 3.75 million pounds in 1931.6 Later, Boh Plantations 
faced less competition locally because import duties were levied. Price 
and quality were both key factors; Boh tea was graded as equal to high-
quality Sri Lankan tea. By 1947, about 50 per cent was sold locally.
To expand Boh Plantations' domestic market share, Tristan increased 
production and marketed aggressively. Professionals were employed 
to organize and oversee operations. The factory was modernized and 
a larger labour force was employed to work on the plantations, while 
newspapers and television were used to publicize the product. In the 
mid-1950s, a cartoon character, 'Mr. Boh', was created for use on Ma-
laysian television, one of Asia's ﬁrst televised company mascots7 (Street 
2005: 33). An extensive distribution network was created, through agents 
and retailers employed throughout the peninsula. 
As a foreign-owned enterprise, the company's most serious concern 
was the government's afﬁrmative action-based New Economic Policy 
(NEP), which was introduced in 1970. The NEP legislated extensive 
state intervention in the economy and the transfer of at least 30 per 
cent of Malaysia's corporate equity to Bumiputera8 by 1990. This policy 
unnerved the Russells, who were confronted with the possibility of re-
linquishing a major interest in their company to an outsider chosen by 
the government. The family diverted investments abroad, to Australia, 
Britain and the United States, a move that undermined the develop-
ment of Boh Plantations. However, the family succeeded in retaining 
managerial control by allowing Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB), a 
government investment agency, rather than an individual to own 27 
per cent of its equity.
With the issue of managerial control resolved, growing and manu-
facturing continued to be modernized and mechanized, particularly in 
harvesting, fertilizing and packing. When labour costs rose, the com-
pany introduced harvesting machines. Mechanical tea harvesters were 
used on the lowland gardens and portable hand-operated machines on 
the highland estates. Air tractors were used to fertilize the plantation. 
The packing factory was upgraded with the installation of high-speed 
Perfecta teabag packaging machines. This German technology could 
turn out 350 string and tag bags a minute. 
Caroline Russell, Tristan's daughter, who joined the family business 
in 1988 after graduating with a degree in commerce from the Univer-
sity of Edinburgh, introduced and spearheaded innovative marketing 
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strategies. John Russell, the younger son and a software designer who 
runs a software ﬁrm in the US, designed and implemented computer 
programmes to make the company's administration and management 
more efﬁcient. Caroline rejuvenated the Boh brand by changing the 
packaging while introducing new products. With its striking graphic 
designs and colours, the new packaging reﬂected a bolder and brighter 
corporate image.9 The company introduced a variety of new products, 
ranging from the Seri Songket-ﬂavoured tea to fruit and herbal infusions, 
ice tea and a three-in-one instant tea mix. Each product was designed to 
cater to the needs of a speciﬁc consumer group: tea connoisseurs, health 
enthusiasts, stressed ofﬁce workers and tourists.10 
Astute management by the third generation has kept the brand rel-
evant, changing with the times to allow Boh Plantations to retain its 
position as Malaysia's leading tea enterprise. The company controls 60 
per cent of the domestic market and about 5 per cent of production is 
exported to Singapore, Brunei, Japan, the US and Denmark. 
Yeo Hiap Seng—Soft Drinks
In 1900, Yeo Kheng Lian established Yeo Hiap Seng (YHS), a soy-sauce 
factory, in Fujian province in China. In Chinese, 'Hiap Seng' means unity 
or unite to succeed. Due to political turmoil, the Yeo family moved the 
business to Singapore in 1935. Later, the factory was expanded to increase 
production, while a manufacturing plant was established in Malaya (Lee 
and Li 2009: 3). YHS grew rapidly by diversifying into canned food and 
bottled drinks. It went on to capture a large section of the soft drink mar-
ket by catering to Chinese tastes that the British-based Fraser & Neave 
Ltd (F&N) had ignored (Gomez and Hsiao 2004: 22). In 1955, YHS became 
the ﬁrst company in the world to introduce soybean milk.11  
One of the Yeo sisters reputedly invented the soybean milk recipe, 
and the technology to bottle the product was jointly developed by 
Tan Chee Teck, son of the eldest Yeo sister, and his cousin Yeo Chee 
Kiat. Bottled soymilk became YHS' best-known product. In 1967, YHS 
scored another world ﬁrst by packing herbal tea and bottling sugarcane 
juice. In 1984, YHS made a breakthrough by developing and packing 
carbonated tropical fruit drinks such as pomelo and sour sop, unique 
to Southeast Asia.12  
To boost production to cope with growing demand, the Yeo brothers 
automated their factory. A bottling line was introduced with a capac-
ity of 1,000 bottles per minute, at the time, the fastest in Southeast Asia 
(Lee and Li 2009: 28). They also created an extensive marketing network 
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comprising a chain of sales ofﬁces, warehouses and depots to distribute 
the company's products in Malaysia and Singapore and abroad. Area 
sales managers and teams of salespeople were recruited to provide 
customers with direct personal services. These strategies helped YHS 
win a lion's share of the soft drink industry in Singapore as well as the 
reputation of a pioneer in this sector in Southeast Asia.
As more family members came to Singapore and joined the enterprise 
in the 1950s, a management team began to take shape. Three pioneers 
managed the main operations: Yeo Thian In took charge of factory 
production; Yeo Thian Kiew handled sales; and Yeo Chee Kiat was 
responsible for plant equipment, machinery and product development. 
Top management was dominated by the founding family members of 
the second generation. Thian In became the permanent chairperson and 
general manager; Thian Soo served as the vice chairperson; and Chee 
Kiat assumed the position of ﬁnance director (Lee and Li 2009: 25). Other 
family members took posts in middle and lower management. 
To raise capital for further expansion, Yeo Hiap Seng Holdings, 
a family ﬁrm, was formed to control the public company, Yeo Hiap 
Seng Ltd, which was listed on the Singapore stock exchange in 1969. In 
1975, YHS (Malaysia) Ltd was quoted on the Malaysian stock exchange 
(Brown 2000: 77). 
When the third generation of the family took control in 1985, problems 
emerged in YHS Holdings, now jointly owned by six families (Lee and 
Li 2009: 5). Family members were divided on matters of investment and 
management. Family feuds became more intense when Alan Yeo Chee 
Yeow, third son of Thian In, became chairperson and president. Under 
Alan's leadership, in 1989 YHS Ltd teamed up with Temasek Holdings, 
the Singapore government's investment arm, to buy the troubled US-
based Asian food company, Chun King Corp (Brown 2000: 83; Friedland 
1989: 108). This US$52-million investment, which absorbed much of YHS 
Ltd's cash reserve, turned out to be a disaster. This failure showed that 
YHS lacked the organizational and managerial competence to penetrate 
markets in North America.  
In 1992, Alan made another controversial decision, asking four rela-
tives to relinquish their senior managerial appointments so he could 
incorporate non-family members into executive positions. Intra-family 
hostilities increased when he tried to acquire 140,000 shares in his son's 
name to obtain more than 50 per cent ownership of the ﬁrm, and thus 
control over decision making (Lee and Li 2009: 6). When he unilaterally 
supported Wing Tai Holdings' bid to acquire between 25.5 and 40 per 
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cent of YHS' equity, family members compelled him to resign (Brown, 
2000: 85; Lee and Li 2009: 6-7). This confrontation led to the liquidation 
of YHS Holdings when family members sold off their shares. 
Robert Ng Chee Siong and Ng Teng Fong of the Sino Land Group won 
control of the company in 1995. The Ng family now controls a majority 
of shares, leaving the Yeo family with almost no equity in the company 
it had founded nearly a century before. Since the Ng family's primary 
interest is property development, they have invested insufﬁciently in 
YHS' drinks business. As a subsidiary business of a property-based 
conglomerate, YHS' reputation as a powerful brand name in the soft 
drinks industry has declined. 
Brand Products, Family Firms and Sustainability
Product Development and R&D
Each of these four family ﬁrms created a brand product by cultivating 
expertise in a speciﬁc industry. All four ﬁrms pursued a three-pronged 
strategy of investing in manufacturing, management and distribution 
to acquire competitive advantages, or in some cases, such as YHS and 
Royal Selangor, 'ﬁrst-mover' advantage. In all cases, these families man-
aged to create a 'brand identity' that remains instantly recognizable, a 
factor that aids consumers' purchasing decisions. Investments in R&D 
proved imperative in all cases to create a unique product, but a key 
factor that differentiated their products from others in the market was 
effective design, packaging and advertising techniques, all central to 
creating a brand identity.
EYS, YHS and Royal Selangor developed products unique to Malaysia, 
but realizing how increasingly competitive the market was becoming, 
they also invested substantially in R&D to improve or diversify their 
product base. R&D to enhance skill formation led to new or improved 
products and innovative production techniques that allowed them to 
stay ahead of the competition, particularly in the case of Royal Selangor 
and YHS (Penrose 1959: 134). 
All four ﬁrms invested in technology to increase production capac-
ity. Joint ventures, particularly with foreign ﬁrms, allowed EYS and 
Royal Selangor to learn new technology crucial for product innovation. 
Product innovation diversiﬁed their range of products to keep buyers 
interested and increased their customer base and sales volume (Beam-
ish 2000: 227).
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By linking with tertiary institutions in Hong Kong, China and Singa-
pore, EYS was able to carry out research to diversify into the manufac-
turing of traditional pills, capsules and powders, thus opening yet more 
new markets. This horizontal diversiﬁcation enabled EYS to revitalize 
its brand once the Eu family had regained control of the enterprise, sug-
gesting the importance of family legacy for sustaining a product. 
Enterprise Development, Public Listing and Feuding
Founding members had an acute sense of stakeholder loyalty that con-
tributed to aggressive reinvestment, and groomed their children from 
an early age to take over the enterprise. However, all these evidently 
entrepreneurial family ﬁrms remain medium scale in terms of market 
capitalization, though their relatively small size is not necessarily by 
choice, and is due primarily to family feuds, which occurred in all cases 
except Boh Plantations. Family feuds of this sort are a core reason why 
some ﬁrms have not been able to maintain control over their brand-
product business. 
The main reasons family ﬁrms go public are the desire to increase 
personal wealth, diversify operations and obtain equity capital for 
expansion (Dyer 1986: 96-98; Ravasi and Marchisio 2001: 2-3). This is 
why EYS and YHS went public. However, public listing appears to 
have contributed to the loss of family control of both ﬁrms. The sale of 
equity by family members, following feuds, made it easier for outsiders 
to take control at a time when they were emerging as major publicly 
listed enterprises.
The reluctance of family ﬁrms to pursue public listing is cited in much 
of the literature as a fundamental weakness among such enterprises, 
caused by the family's desire to retain strong—and unaccountable—con-
trol. By remaining private, they need not divulge information that would 
make them susceptible to a takeover, either by other businesspeople 
or by the state. However, the lack of enthusiasm of ﬁrms such as Boh 
Plantations and Royal Selangor for public listing has not held them 
back from marketing their products, domestically and abroad. They 
have attracted professional managerial staff. This suggests that public 
listing is not crucial to create brand products.
Issuing stock to the public means expanding ownership of a busi-
ness, but a family can retain control if they maintain a majority stake. 
However, with the appointment of non-family members to the board of 
directors, and the family's growth in size and emergence of a new gen-
eration, management can become increasingly fractious. The interests 
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of public owners and the family can diverge. Public owners, including 
institutional investors and non-family investors, are generally more in-
terested in short-term ﬁnancial returns, while families typically pursue 
longer-term goals and emphasize issues such as status in the community 
(Davis 2008: 140). If a publicly listed ﬁrm encounters a problem of suc-
cession, family feuds can intensify and eventually put ownership and 
control at risk. The cases of EYS and YHS show how intergenerational 
succession can lead to family feuds that contribute to takeovers.
The case studies show that family ﬁrms listed on the stock exchange 
are particularly prone to takeovers in succession crises. Companies that 
remain privately owned are also susceptible to feuds, but as the case of 
Royal Selangor indicates, family members of a private enterprise need 
not in such cases lose ownership of the product they have created. This 
is because only family members have the commitment, skills and knowl-
edge to continue to develop the product. The families of publicly listed 
enterprises like YHS that fall to outsiders are likely to lose ownership 
of the product, whose market share may decline. 
Generational Change and Succession Planning 
While founders of family ﬁrms attempt to perpetuate their legacy and 
ensure family control when generational change occurs, ensuring a 
smooth succession has proved difﬁcult. Succession, as the case studies 
indicate, was an epochal moment in their corporate history. Improper 
handling led to their division, dismantling or takeover. Such problems 
arose when those taking the helm failed to establish authority or gain 
the support of other family members (Dyer 1986; Rose 1993).
The case studies show that the principal reason for family feuds when 
generational change transpires lies in problems with the enterprise's 
leadership. Family feuds occurred in all cases except Boh Plantations, 
where the Russell family experienced little problem with the succes-
sion. Three factors—succession planning, the strongly paternalistic 
role of predecessors and a small number of siblings in the family busi-
ness—contributed to the smooth succession in Boh Plantations. These 
factors were absent from the other ﬁrms.
For the Eu family, the third generation, which was not involved in 
managing the family business, played no strong paternalistic role in 
preparing the fourth generation to take charge. In the Yong family, 
Yong Koon, the patriarch, did not designate a successor from among 
his four sons or design any governance structure to manage the family 
business. Although there was succession planning in the Yeo family, the 
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number of siblings and cousins given control of the family enterprise 
was far too large. The plethora of Yeo family members in management 
contributed to major disagreements over investment and shareholding, 
which harmed the business. The decline of YHS and EYS was mainly due 
to feuds among the second and third generations. It seems to be harder 
to sustain a relationship among cousins than among siblings, at least 
to judge from the case of YHS and EYS. However, in Royal Selangor, a 
dispute among the brothers led to the incorporation of new enterprises 
by each. The case studies indicate that building a uniﬁed shareholder 
vision after a generational transition is extremely difﬁcult. 
Whether or not a uniﬁed vision is created depends on who controls 
decision making following generational change. It is especially difﬁcult 
when the chief executive from among the new generation lacks the sup-
port of his siblings and other family members who are shareholders. In 
such cases, each equity holder is likely to have his or her own vision of 
how the company should go forward, and stock holders seldom share 
a common vision. This issue was most evident in the case of Royal Se-
langor, EYS and YHS.
While family disputes can lead to the demise of ﬁrms, Royal Selangor 
suggests that siblings with expertise going it alone can foster competition 
that helps improve quality. This appears to be one reason why Royal 
Selangor thrived. Malaysian corporate history has cases of partnership 
feuds leading to new ventures in the same sector that contributed to 
more competition and improved efﬁciency and productivity, to the 
beneﬁt of the domestic economy.13 
Horizontal Development and Organizational Capacity
A core issue in the literature on family business and those adopting a 
Chandlerian perspective is whether they can diversify. This study of 
Boh Plantations, Royal Selangor, YHS and EYS suggests that a focused 
approach to enterprise development is imperative. The Eu and the Rus-
sell families gradually abandoned their diversiﬁed business interests and 
concentrated on one sector. The Yong and Yeo families, who engaged 
in product innovation by ﬁne-tuning their organization, focused on 
only one business. A horizontal form of enterprise development rather 
than a diversiﬁed pattern of growth enabled these founding families 
to build a brand product and, in the case of Boh Plantations, EYS and 
Royal Selangor, to sustain it. 
In all cases, a decision-making structure centred on the founder 
evolved into a more formal hierarchy with differentiated functions, 
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through the recruitment of professionals to ﬁll key managerial and 
specialist roles. This professionalization involved institutionalization 
of decision making and strategic planning; appointment of non-family 
professionals to managing positions; and the training of the younger 
generation as professional managers before entrusting them with im-
portant management tasks. EYS, Royal Selangor and Boh Plantations 
underwent this process of professionalization. The Eu family created 
administrative structures that coordinated the ﬂow of materials to 
improve product quality. The devolution of authority to professional 
managers was necessary to accumulate shareable knowledge that in turn 
enhanced organizational capabilities. Royal Selangor's employment of 
a Dane in the design department increased its range of products, while 
EYS' managers in product development and distribution enhanced ef-
ﬁciency and improved proﬁtability.
For the board of directors, the appointment of outsiders with dif-
ferent sorts of professional training helped with decision making and 
with the formulation and implementation of long-term strategic plans. 
EYS's six-member board of directors had three non-family members; 
Royal Selangor also had three, while Boh Plantations had two. In middle 
management, family professionals with tertiary education have been 
recruited to take charge of ﬁnance, marketing, purchasing, informa-
tion technology and production. On the other hand, a similar level of 
professionalization of management did not happen in YHS, although 
this lack does not seem to have hindered the company's international 
competitiveness in the early stages of its growth. Even though there was 
an outsider on YHS's board of directors, family members dominated the 
management and the chairperson exercised a lot of authority. 
Role of the State
The cases indicate that the state can play an important role in numer-
ous ways to help nurture domestic enterprise. In the colonial period, 
J.A. Russell's associates in government granted him plantation land to 
produce tea, a viable industry that helped reduce imports. Royal Selan-
gor's venture into large-scale manufacturing in the 1960s was due to the 
Malaysian government's policies to promote lucrative entrepreneurial 
enterprises in niche industries. Recognizing Royal Selangor's capacity 
to develop a unique pewter ware sector, the government provided aid 
and foreign consultancy services that helped this small, home-based 
operation evolve into a large manufacturing enterprise with work proc-
esses that improved quality and enhanced productivity. As the com-
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pany's reputation grew internationally, the title 'Royal' was bestowed, 
an endorsement that garnered it even greater respect domestically and 
abroad (Chen 2003: 61-62). 
Other forms of state support to aid enterprise development have 
been attempted. The collaboration by the Singapore government's in-
vestment arm, Temasek Holdings, with YHS in the ill-fated acquisition 
of US-based Chun King Corporation was aimed at cultivating local 
industries by helping them expand their markets abroad. The govern-
ment thought YHS had the expertise to use Chun King Corporation to 
nurture a market for its unique products in North America. The failure 
of this venture did not damage the relationship between the govern-
ment and YHS, although it precipitated a family feud that eventually 
led to the ﬁrm's takeover. 
The creation of close ties with the state, however, can have serious 
repercussions. While EYS' attempt to appoint politicians to the board 
of directors to secure access to government concessions often happens 
in large enterprises, in this case it contributed to a serious family feud. 
Charles Eu's proposed appointment of PLA members to the EYS board 
before the return of Hong Kong to China by the British drew the ire of 
family members, convinced this would lead to the takeover of the ﬁrm 
by politicians (Sharp 2009: 135-136). The close ties that J.A. Russell had 
established with prominent members of the British colonial government 
aided the early development of Boh Plantations. When afﬁrmative ac-
tion was introduced in Malaysia in 1970, partly to redistribute corporate 
equity more equitably between ethnic communities, inﬂuential politi-
cians won access to a large stake in publicly listed and foreign ﬁrms, 
including board appointments, a factor that ﬁrst led to transfer of assets 
abroad by the Russell family. The Russell family, however, managed 
to maintain ownership and control of the company by incorporating a 
government-owned institutional investor as a major shareholder, one 
that did not interfere with the management of the ﬁrm yet allowed Boh 
Plantations to maintain cordial though arms-length relations with the 
state. Since targeting under afﬁrmative action has signiﬁcantly re-shaped 
corporate ownership and control patterns, non-Bumiputeras have been 
reluctant to invest in R&D for fear that their ﬁrms may be appropriated 
by the state during redistribution endeavours to alleviate inter-ethnic 
wealth inequities (Gomez 1999, 2009; Jesudason 1989; Searle 1999). While 
Boh Plantations and Royal Selangor have invested in R&D, they have 
bypassed active state intrusion in the ownership of their equity by not 
publicly listing their ﬁrms.
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Conclusion
This study set out to discover what features of family ﬁrms can pro-
duce brand products and to understand why such ﬁrms have not 
emerged as leading publicly listed ﬁrms in Malaysia. By employing 
concepts from the family business literature, in conjunction with 
a Chandlerian perspective that assesses the historical evolution of 
four family ﬁrms, insights have been obtained into these questions. 
In all four ﬁrms, a common feature was that the families had invested 
heavily in product-speciﬁc modes of production, innovative distribution 
techniques and a professional managerial force. These features were 
particularly evident in ﬁrms that survived over three generations. The 
issue of strategic agility was equally crucial in dealing with economic 
or business crises. During a serious recession in the 1930s, Boh Planta-
tions demonstrated an ability to focus on a core business and Royal 
Selangor to diversify its product range. This reﬂects another important 
feature of these four ﬁrms: in the early stages of development, sustaining 
growth required innovation through R&D. In all cases, product-speciﬁc 
production and effective marketing were crucial in helping them cre-
ate brand products. This emphasis on an organic mode of growth, to 
create competitive advantage through differentiation, meant that their 
products had a dominant presence in the market.
Other important factors, such as a succession plan and public listing, 
had a bearing on sustainability. The presence of a potentially predatory 
state was also a factor. For Royal Selangor and Boh Plantations, these two 
factors were crucial in allowing the Russell and Yong families to retain 
ownership and control. In both cases, the growing professionalization 
of management was vital to sustain organizational capacity.
Promoting organizational capacity is essential, given that business 
growth invariably slows (most graphically in the case of YHS), so that 
outsiders must be brought in to expand the ﬁrm's market share. In the 
case of YHS, family shareholders were reluctant to reduce their share-
holding, even if this led to an expansion of the ﬁrm's market share. 
This suggests that, following generational change, retaining managerial 
control is difﬁcult in family ﬁrms. 
The core factor in all four ﬁrms was their ability to develop a brand 
identity, as well as to diversify the range of products produced under 
their brand name. Family members, who had the knowledge to develop 
and sustain this product, nurtured these brand identities. This was most 
obvious in the case of YHS and Royal Selangor. 
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Loss of ownership and control to non-family members led to the 
decline of the product in the case of EYS and YHS. The case studies 
conﬁrm why, following a takeover, these ﬁrms with brand products 
did not emerge as major publicly listed ﬁrms. In family businesses, 
the focus is on perpetuating ownership within the family to build an 
enterprise for future generations. This desire is greater than that of 
making more money, which suggests that to sustain the enterprise 
in the long run, families need to distinguish between ownership and 
control. Recognizing this distinction would mean moving to a manage-
rial form of control, with families holding equity ownership. This may 
help families retain equity ownership in the long run while allowing 
them to increase shareholder value and augment their brand identity, 
primarily through R&D.
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NOTES
1  For an overview of the literature on family ﬁrms, see Aronoff (1998); Colli (2003); 
Daily and Dollinger (1991, 1992, 1993); Dyer (1986); Jones and Rose (1993); Sharma 
(2004); Sharma, Chrisman and Chua (1997); and Tàpies and Ward (2008). 
2  Lambrecht and Lievens (2008) note, after reviewing articles published by the journal 
Family Business Review during its ﬁrst ten years, that a majority of the studies focus 
on the issue of succession. This topic continues to feature as a key concern in the 
literature on family ﬁrms, with numerous debates of the factors that contribute to 
the sustainability of such enterprises over two or more generations. 
3  Jacqueline Ann Surin, 'Eu Yan Sang big on R&D'. The Star 12 March 2001, p. 22.
4  Ibid.
5 B.K. Sidhu, 'Wall Street crashes, Archie strikes Boh', The Star 7 May 2001, pp. 14-15.
6   One pound is equal to about 0.45 kilograms.
7  Mike Street, 'A Walk Down Memory Lane with Tristan Russell'. Malaysia His-
tory, September 2005. Available at: http://www.expatkl.com/magazinearticles/
sept0905_4.pdf (accessed 25 June 2010).
8  This term means 'sons of the soil' and is used with particular reference to one ethnic 
group, the Malays, though it also includes indigenous communities in the peninsula 
and in the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak.
9  Hanim Melan, 'Boh on the go'. Malaysian Business 16 May 1998, p. 33.
10  Hanim Melan, 'Boh on the go'. Malaysian Business 16 May 1998, p. 33.
11  Jacqueline Ann Surin, 'Yeo Hiap Seng went like a bomb during WWII'. The Star 19 
March 2001, pp. 22-23.
12  Jacqueline Ann Surin, 'How the Yeo family lost their control'. The Star 19 March 2001, 
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p. 23.
13  See Gomez (1999) for a study of the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC), 
where a feud among the shareholders led to the incorporation of a number of banks 
that emerged as key players in the Malaysian economy. 
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